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NOTES

LARCENY BY TRICK IN PENNSYLVANIA
It is the purpose of this article to point out one of the areas wherein the offense
known to the common law as larceny was blatantly deficient in its attempts to protect the right of possession and ownership of personal property the efforts of the
courts to remedy this deficiency in the law and the manner in which the Pennsylvania judiciary coped with the problem.
The early common law courts were faced with th'e anomalous situation wherein a person who had obtained possession of the goods of another by a direct physical
act of trespass would be liable to sanction, but another who had obtained possession
"peaceably" from the own'er by means of fraud was not so liable. This distinction
led to the development of the crime known as "larceny by trick".
At common law and in Pennsylvania the crime of larceny has been defined
as "the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right, with
the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner, without his
consent".'
The Penal Code of Pennsylvania does not define the crime of larceny, nor
does it define the crime of larceny by trick, but merely states that, "Whoever com-2 Since the offense constituting larceny and
mits larceny, is guilt of felony ..
Penal Code, the common law definition apthe
by
larceny by trick is not defined
8
plies in Pennsylvania.
From the beginning, th'e physical element of the crime of larceny was limited
to situations where there was a wrongful taking from the possession of the own4
er without his consent and a carrying away of the property obtained in this manner.
Thus it is readily apparent, and the cases so held that the taking must be under such
circumstances as to amount technically to a trespass. 5 It has been stated:
"Every larceny includes a trespass; from whence it follows that if
the party be guilty of no trespass in6 taking the goods, he cannot be guilty
of felony in carrying them away."
Thus, the property must be taken from the actual or constructive possession
of the owner,7 and it must be without his consent.8 It therefore follows that one
who is hims'elf in lawful possession of goods cannot commit a trespass upon those
goods in converting them to his own use and hence could not be guilty of larceny
Thomas v. Kessler, 334 Pa. 7, 5 A.2d 187 (1939), citing 2 Wharton, Criminal Law § 1097.
2 Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 807, 18 P.S. 4807; "In spite of the declaration, however,
'whoever commits larceny' is not under any and all circumstances 'guilty of a felony' for it is specifically provided that one who commits larceny of 'growing property'-Sec. 811, ibid, or 'coal or
iron ore'-Sec. 812, ibid, is guilty of a misdemeanor". Hitchler, The Common Law Felonies in Pennsylvania, 48 Dick. L. Rev. 57.
S Commonwealth v. Doran, 145 Pa. Super. 173, 20 A.2d 815 (1941).
4 May, Criminal Law § 240, (4th Ed., 1938).
5 "Larceny is a wrong against possession, and every larceny contains within it a trespass de bonis
asportatis." Commonwealth v. Meinhart, 173 Pa. Super. 495, 98 A.2d 392 (1953).
6 Commonwealth v. Barrett, 28 Pa. Super. 112 (1905), citing 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown c. 19,
p. 208.
7 Commonwealth v. Helmick, 119 Pa. Super. 256, 180 Atl. 759 (1935).
8 Commonwealth v. Dehle, 42 Pa. Super. 300 (1910).
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of such goods. 9 Nor can trespass or larceny be committed by the taking of the
goods where such is done with the voluntary consent of the owner. 10
Where the owner, however, had been induced by fraud to part with his goods,
the common law courts' requirement of a trespassory taking frustrated the application of criminal justice, and the illicit undertakings of a rogue often went unpunished.
With the rise of commerce and industry and the attendant commercial transactions, it soon became apparent that the growth of complicated commercial transactions and the more subtle means of illicit deprivation of property increased the
necessity of the development and expansion of the traditional crime of larceny to
include situations where the owners of goods were induced to voluntarily part with
possession of them through fraudulent means, or to create new crimes.'"
Mr. Justice Holmes, in recognition of this problem, stated:
"The evil is the same whether the misappropriation is made by a
man into whose hands the owner has put the property, or by one who has
wrongfully taken it away. But primitive law in, its weakness did not get
much beyond an effort to prevent violence, and very naturally made a
wrongful taking a trespass, part of its definition of the crime. In modern
times the judges enlarged the definition a little by holding that, if the
wrongdoer gets possession by a trick or device the crime is committed.
This really was giving up the requirements of a trespass and it would have
been more logical, as well as truer
to present object of the law, to abandon
2
the requirement altogether."'
The courts, however, did not adopt such a realistic approach but attacked
the problem in a manner frequently resorted to, by the use of a fiction.
In 1779, the crime of common law larceny was radically extended by the
process of judicial construction, in the case of Rex v. Pear,13 to include another
method by which the obtaining of the goods of another through fraud, rather
than by a direct overt act of trespass, became punishable. In this case, the defendant
hired a horse under the pretense of taking a journey. On the same day he sold the
hors'e and delivered it to a stranger, such having been his intention from the very
beginning. The court held this to be larceny in spite of delivery by the owner, for
the original intent having been fraudulent, "the parting with the property had not
changed the nature of the possession, but... it remained unaltered in the prosecutor

9 Commonwealth v. Tluchak, 166 Pa. Super. 16, 19, 70 A.2d 657 (1950), citing 52 C.J.S. §
31 and § 1.
10 Commonwealth v. Van Foerster, 79 Pa. Super. 174 (1922).
11 The early development was mainly a threefold one with the creation by the legislature of the
crimes of obtaining property by false public token; 33 H. VIII, c. 1, and by false pretenses; 30 Geo.
II, c. 24; and the decision in Rex. v. Pear, 2 East P.C. 685, 1 Leach C.C. 212 (1779).
12 Miller, Criminal Law, 357-358 (1934), citing Mr. Holmes from 10 Harv. L. Rev. 459, 470.
18 2 East P.C. 685, 1 Leach C.C. 212 (1779).
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at the time of the conversion".14 The decision in the Pear case led to the development of the doctrine which today is known in the law as "larceny by trick".
"The rule seems to be well established in this country that where
one obtains possession of property by fraud, deceit or device, such possession in the defendant and consent on the part of the owner does not exonerate the defendant from prosecution for larceny, if at the time the
defendant obtained the possession he had the secret intention of appropriating the goods to his own use. Though the crime of larceny is
founded upon a trespass in the taking; nevertheless, if the possession
of the property be obtained by fraud and deceit, the fraud will take the
place of the trespass or is equivalent thereto."' 5
The decision in the Pear case at once raised the question whether the common
law felony of larceny by trick now covered the entire area of the fraudulent obtaining of goods of another, or whether it and the crime of false pretenses then
in existence,' 6 a statutory misdemeanor, were mutally exclusive. The crimes were
similar in the following respects. In both crimes (1) the defendant obtains possession of the property with the consent of the owner; (2) the owner of the property is induced by fraud to part with possession; and (3) the defendant intends to
deprive the owner thereof permanently.
The courts, however, were quick to draw a distinction. Perhaps the major
reason at the time for making this distinction is well expressed by Justice Paxson in
Commonwealth v. Eichelberger'7 where he stated:
"The distinction between larceny [by trick] and false pretense is a
very nice one in many instances. In some of the old English cases, the
difference is more artificial than real and rests purely upon technical
grounds. Much of this nicety is doubtless owing to the fact that at the time
many of the cases were decided, larceny was a capital felony in England
and the judges naturally leaned to a merciful interpretation of the law out
of a tender regard for human life."
The Eichelberger case is the first and only Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision which has dealt directly with the distinction between the crimes of larceny
by trick and of obtaining property by false pretenses and which has held a defendant guilty of larceny by trick. Justice Paxson quotes extensively from an opinion
which he had written several years prior to the Eichelbergerdecision in 1889, while
14 "That this decision was a novelty, and an unwarranted modification of the law of larceny appears

upon an examination of the authorities cited by the court", says Joseph H. Beale, Jr. in "The Borderand of Larceny," 6 Harv. L. Rev. 244, (1892), after which he goes into an excellent and thorough
analysis of the cases used by the court to justify their decision, and then how later decisions have
blundered in the application of the doctrine of the case. But Beale concedes, "It is too late, however,
to quarrel with the decision in Pear's Case. It was followed within a few years by a number of cases;
and its doctrine, under the name of larceny by trick, is a most vigorous one today."
15 13 Miss. L. J. 270 (1941).
16 Act of 30 George II, c. 24 punished for a misdemeanor "....
all persons who knowingly and
designedly, by false pretence or pretences, shall obtain from any person or persons, money, goods,
wares or merchandises, with intent to cheat or defraud any person or persons of the same." In
America this act was not part of the common law except in a few states, but similar statutes have
universally been enacted.
17 Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, 119 Pa. 254, 13 AU. 422 (1888).
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he had been on the bench of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
In that case, Commonwealth v. Yerkes, 18 Justice Paxson wrote:
"The distinction between larceny and cheating by false pretenses
is well stated in Russel on Crimes, 5th Amer. ed., 28. After an exhaustive
review of the cases the learned author says: 'The correct distinction in
cases of this kind seems to be, that if by means of any trick or artifice,
the owner of property is induced to part with the possession only, still
meaning to r'etain the right of property, the taking by such means will
amount to larceny; but if the owner part with, not only the possession of
the goods but the right of property in them also, the offense of the
party obtaining them will not be larceny, but the offense of obtaining
goods by false pretenses.' I could not add to this were I to write a vofUtme.
Upon completion of this quotation, Justice Paxson continues:
"The rule itself is distinct and clarly cut; the difficulty consists in
its application to the facts of each particular case, varied as they are by the
ingenuity of the particular rogue who makes the facts."
By adoption of the rule as stated by Russel, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recognized the common law doctrine of larceny by trick and made it part of the
law of the Commonwealth.
The rule as thus laid down in the Eichelberger case has been successfully applied by the Pennsylvania courts in many instances and without much difficulty.
A brief survey will follow.
In the first reported case after the decision in Commonwealth v. Eichelberger,19
D purchased certain goods from V at a public sale, the conditions of which were
cash and no removal of the goods until they were paid for. D gave V a check for an
amount in excess of the price of the goods which V accepted as full payment and
satisfaction of the purchase price, and returned the difference which was in excess
of the money given over the money due, in cash. There was no money to support
the check thus made by D. The court charged the jury with the law as stated in the
Eichelbergercase and then further charged that if the jury believed that V intended
to part with both title and possession when he accepted D's check, the latter would
not be guilty of larceny. It was held that D was not guilty.
In Commonwealth v. Pioso,20 V purchased some horses from D the payment
for which he made in the form of a note which D discounted. When the note became
due and V wanted to renew the obligation by another note, V made out a second
note and gave it to D to deliver to the bank for the purpose of lifting the first note
given "and for no other purpose". In violation of this confidence, D discounted the
second note also and appropriated the proceeds of it to his own use. In application
of the general principle, the jury decided that V did not intend to part with the title
in the note to D and hence held him guilty of larceny.
Commonwealth v. Yerkes, 29 Leg. Int. 60 (1872).
19 Commonwealth v. Diffenderfer, 8 Lanc. L. R. 209 (1891).
20 Commonwealth v. Pioso, 19 Lanc. L. R. 145 (1902).
18
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D was indicted and convicted for larceny of $5,280.30 in Commonwealth v.
Perrine.21 Here D, an insurance agent, induced V to make application to the
Traveler's Life Insurance Company for a policy in the sum of $100,000 on the
promise that the first annual premium would be only $325, instead of the regular
cost of $5,280.30. D further induced V to draw a check for the larger amount to
the order of cash or bearer and to allow him to accompany V to the bank. The proceeds of the check were placed upon the desk in front of the parties, and before
V could get it, D seized all of the money and left the bank. Upon these facts, the
court said it was clear that D's scheme was to get possession of the money representing the full amount of the check by fraud and trickery and to thereafter appropriate the same to his own use. The check was never delivered to D, nor was
the money parted with by V willingly or intentionally. The court cites Commonwealth v. Eichelberger to support its decision and quotes from it extensively.
In Commonwealth v. Quinn,22 D, appellant, with divers other persons was
charged with various crimes, one of which was larceny by trick. D, with a conspirator, entered various business establishments with a "John Doe" warrant. By the
use of such warrant, they seized several pinball machines and other machines and
informed the Vs that they would be getting a notice for a hearing "in a few days"
on the charge of illegal possession of gambling machines. The Vs never received any
such notice. D, with his conspirators, was using the warrant as a means of procuring the possession of the machin'es and would, in turn, sell the machines to other
business establishments. A verdict of guilty on the charge of larceny was rendered
in the lower court.2 3 In affirming the conviction on appeal, the court stated:
"Using a warrant to facilitate the stealing of another's property is no
different from using an artifice or trick. Where by means of any trick
or artifice, the owner of property is induced to part with possession only,
still retaining the right of property, the taking by such means amounts to
larceny if done animo furandi."
The Eichelberger case is used by this court as the basis for this part of its
decision.
Commonwealth v. Van Foerster2 4 illustrates again the general rule as applied
by the courts that where the owner intended to part with the property in the thing
which was delivered over to the defendant, the crime is not one of larceny. The conviction of larceny was reversed because here "the prosecutor delivered the property in question absolutely, with the understanding that the one receiving the
property might thereafter proceed to apply it to his own use." The evidence showed
that D was engaged in the promotion of the sale of lots in a certain tract of land.
V, at the solicitation of one of his friends, became interested in the enterprise and
Commonwealth v. Perrine, 46 Pa. Super. 637 (1911).
22 Commonwealth v. Quinn, 144 Pa. Super. 400, 19 A.2d 526 (1941).
21

28
24

There were various incidents and "arrests", but the above is indicative of them all.
See n. 10, supra.
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subsequently purchased one of the lots for which D gave a deed. The enterprise
fell short of V's expectancy. At the trial V testified that he intended to part with
his money upon receiving title to the property.
D was indicted and convicted of larceny by trick in Commonwealth v. Helmick,
and the conviction was sustained 25 when it appeared that D had purchased a ring
on a bailment lease, obtaining a credit against the purchase price by another ring
given by V to D, and made a gift of the leased ring to V, who, at the time, had no
knowledge that the latter gift was under lease. Later D, for the purpose of surrendering the ring to the bailors upon their demand, because of his failure to make
the necessary payments, induced V to part with possession so that he might have it
insured. Subsequently, the bailors returned the ring to D who refused to return
it to V on demand. D retained the ring for several months after which it was finally
6
redelivered to the bailors.2
In an application of the facts in the above cases, the Pennsylvania courts seemed to experience little difficulty with the doctrine of larceny by trick as distinguished from obtaining property by false pr'etenses as announced in the Eichelberger
case. The courts, however, have not found a practical application of the rule to
the particular facts of each case as simple as the rule and have experienced the
same difficulties as the courts of other states. It has been stated:
"An investigation of the modern law of larceny gives an impression
of utter confusion, a field for the courts to exercise their abilities in
making fine, technical, and narrow distinctions. Frequently it appears to
be largely a matter of guess-work as to whether or not the offense cornmittedis larceny, embezzlement, obtaining property by false pretenses,
in a vain
or some other form of statutory offense created by the legislature
27
attempt to fill up some loophole in the existing laws."
A brief survey and analysis will follow of the Pennsylvania cases in which
the writer believes the courts have confused the correct application of the rule in
order to reach a desired end.
The Pennsylvania courts, in an attempt to do justice in the particular case
before them, found it necessary at times to interpret the facts in such a way as to
make the offense fit the hard and fast definition of the crime which they were
trying to apply.28
In Commonwealth v. Yerkes,2 9 which was used by Justice Paxson as a basis
for his holding in the Eichelberger case, D, who was not an employee of the city
25 Commonwealth v. Helmick, 119 Pa. Super. 256, 180 At. 759 (1935).
2C The court also found as a matter of law that V had enough of a property interest in the ring
to satisfy the "of another" element of larceny.
27 30 Yale L. J. 613 (1921).
28 This has been a common error by many courts. For a more complete discussion of the difficulty
in drawing the distinction and the confusion into which other courts have fallen see Beale's article
cited in n. 15, supra; 20 Col. L. Rev. 318 (1920); and 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 487 (1939).
29 See n. 18, supra.
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but who was authorized thereby to purchase bonds and mortgages on the account
of the sinking fund of Philadelphia, procured from the city clerk a check in the
amount of $33,000 which he stated, at the time of obtaining it, was to be applied
as payment on bonds which he allegedly had procured. As a matter of fact, the
bonds were never purchased by D. Upon obtaining the check from the clerk, D
immediately deposited it to his own personal account and subsequently drew therefrom a number of checks to his personal use. The court speaking through Justice
Paxson stated that, "We do not think this a case of false pretenses because there
was not any intention on the part of the city officers to part with the property in
the check but with the possession merely and no relation of debtor and creditor
arose out of the transaction." Here, the court reasons further, D had merely received
the check for purposes of transmission to the persons from whom he claimed to
have purchased the stock. The city did not intend to pass to him the right of property as evidenced by the check.
Justice Paxson's reasoning in this case shows the beginning of the straining
by the courts to reach a certain goal. By his ability to cope with such a barrier, he
reasoned that it was true the city had intended to part with its property in the
check, but "certainly not in favor of the defendant". Thus, in order to continue to
follow the traditional distinction between the crimes of larceny by trick and the
obtaining of property by false pretenses and still give the defendant the just punishment he deserved for such an illicit act, Justice Paxson created an apparent modification to the larceny by trick doctrine to the effect that if the victim intended
to pass title in the property (which is obviously the situation here and thus would
normally constitute the crime of obtaining by false pretenses) but not to the defendant, only intending to give the defendant possession, then the offense is still
larceny by trick.
In the next case, 80 D, being indebted to a bank in the form of a note for $1600,
paid the cashier the discount thereon for another ninety days and, in exchange for
the original note, gave him one for $16 with the deliberate intent and design to defraud the bank, the cashier believing he was giving him a note for $1600. Justice
Paxson, now sitting as a justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, affirmed his
earlier decision of Commonwealth v. Yerkes, supra, rendered when he was occupying a seat on the bench of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. He
again follows the same line of reasoning as in the Yerkes case to find again that the
facts constituted larceny by trick. He remarked:
"It would be the baldest technicality, a mere sticking in the bark,
to hold that the bank intended to part with any right of property by a
mere delivery to the defendant of a piece of paper which, qua paper, was
of no value. It did not intend to deliver the evidence of its debt, because
it supposed it was getting another of 'equal value and would have received it, but for the trick and fraud of the defendant."
80 See n. 17, supra.
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The last case to be considered in this connection is Commonwealth v. Dehle.81
D, after meeting by chance V, a foreigner, pretended to find $50, which was in
fact a worthless confederate bill. D offered to divide the money with V, and V,
being ignorant of the character of the bill, gave V $25 in current money and took the
confederate bill in exchange for his share. D was held guilty of larceny by trick.
Again the passage of both title and possession in the $25 was obviously effected,
and again the court in an attempt to arrest one of "the devices through which
rogues have deceived honest men in making change", very cleverly justified and
confirmed the conviction of larceny by trick. Here, Justice Porter quotes from 1
Hawkin's P.C. 145:
"When property is obtained with a preconcerted design to steal
it, the possession is supposed to continue with the true owner, whatever
may be the means or the pretense under which the property is obtained."
He then quotes from 2 East's P.C. 677:
"When goods or money are delivered with the understanding and intention that the property shall remain in the presence of the owner until
the goods are paid for, or other money is .immediately returned in exchange for that delivered, the legal possession remains in the owner till
the property is altered by the perfection of the contract, which remains inchoate until perfected by the parties."
Thus, in effect, Justice Porter is stating that even though V may have attempted to part with the title to the particular money in question, because the defendant had a preconcerted design to steal when he practiced his fraud, the possession is supposed to continue in V. Then, to further support the opinion and
conviction, the court accepts fully the rule of the Eichelbergercase. 82
It is to be regretted that the law writers and courts have undertaken to create
a fixed distinction between the crimes of larceny by trick and the obtaining of
property by false pretenses by a hard and fast rule, and then have proceeded to
iender the distinction valueless by reasoning which, although rendering just results,
cannot be reconciled with the rules so broadly laid down. The Court has remarked:
"In fact all false pretense is practically larceny by trick and the attempt to hold that this statutory offense has a fixed and definite line of
demarkation from the common law offense of larceny is not logical and
does not work out in practice, as is well illustrated in the Eichelberger
and Dehle cases." 88
There remains to be considered in this discussion another important situation,
whether a defendant would be guilty of the offense of larceny by trick or of the
offense of obtaining property by false pretenses where the victim intended to part
31 See n. 8, supra.
82 "The suggestion that the prosecutor by accepting the $50 Confederate bill in exchange for his
money, parted not only with the possession, is conclusively answered by Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, .... " from which he quotes extensively.
38 Commonwealth v. Adler, 48 Pa. C.C. 544 (1918).
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with the title, but it did not actually pass. The only Pennsylvania case deciding
this is Lewer v. Commonwealth,84 decided in 1823, in which Chief Justice Tilghman refuses to extend the crime of larceny to cover any class of case except where
the property was taken against the will of the owner, and he holds that where it
was the owner's intent that the possession should never return to him there was
no larceny. 85 The decision is a correct one and in line with the general rule at the
time. The majority view today, however, would hold the offense to be larceny by
trick.86 In view of the courts' attempt to sustain more convictions of larceny, it
seems quite apparent that when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is called upon
again in this situation it will hold the offense to be larceny by trick.
Will the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustain the traditional distinction between the crimes of larceny by trick and obtaining property by false pretenses the
next time it is called upon to do so, in the light of four recent developments in the
law which are extremely important and which bear directly upon the matter?
(1) Some states
have abolished the distinction between the two
7
crimes by statute.
(2) The Penal Code of Pennsylvania now provides: "If, upon the
trial of any person indicted for such felony [false pretenses], it shall
be proved that he obtained the property in question in such manner as to
amount in law to larceny, he shall not, by reason thereof, be entitled to
be acquitted for such felony. No person tried for such felony shall be
liable to be afterwards prosecuted for larceny upon the same facts."88
(3) On May 21, 1943, the general statute in Pennsylvania on the
offense of obtaining property by false pretenses8 9 was amended to make
th' crime a felony. Therefore, since 1943, both crimes are felonies in
Pennsylvania.
(4) The deemphasis of title in the Uniform Commercial Code,40
and its basic change from the common law "property" approach in comercial transactions may have an affect. Since purported commercial trans•44 Lewer v. Commonwealth, 15 S. & R. 93 (1826). Here D fraudulently induced V to sell him
certain goods for his brother by stating that he, D, was acting as the agent for his brother, and that
the latter had sent the money to D who would in turn pay V. D presented a letter allegedly written
by his principal, substantiating D's statement of the alleged principal-agency relationship. In reality
D never had a brother and had falsely written the letter himself. When D gave V his personal check,
V intended to part with title to the goods to D's alleged, but non-existant, principal.
15 "1 have seen no judicial decision, which is authority in this court, carrying the doctrine of what
may be called constructive larceny, beyond the case where possession only was intended to be deliver.
ed; and I am for stopping there, because we have a line distinctly marked, which is of great importance in criminal law".
86 See n. 14, supra.
37 For example, the Ohio General Code, § 12447-1, enacted September 16, 1943, provides, "Whoever obtains possession, or title to, anything of value with the consent of the person from whom he
obtains it ....
is guilty of larceny by trick."
88 Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 836, 18 P.S. 4836.
39 Entitled "Cheating by fraudulent pretenses". Made a felony by the amending Act of May 21,
1943, P.L. 306, § 1.
40 Act of April 6, 1953, P.L. 3, §§ 1-101 to end, 12A P,S, 1 to end.
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actions are the basis of many criminal indictments, th- influence of the
Code and its novel approach may affect the importance and emphasis
placed by the criminal courts on the common law "property and possession concept in making distinctions between various crimes.
In conclusion, in Pennsylvania the common law crime of larceny by trick is
well established. If one obtains possession of goods from the owner or possessor
by some trick, artifice or fraud, with the intent, at the time of so obtaining, to appropriate the goods to his own use, and the owner intends to pass merely possession
and not title, he commits the crime of larceny by trick if and when he converts the
goods to his own use.
Larceny by trick is to be distinguished from the crime of obtaining property
by false pretenses where the owner intends to part absolutely with both title and
possession to the goods in question. 4
If the owner intends to part with title, but title does not pass, the present
Pennsylvania view is in accord with the minority and older view and holds the
crime to be the obtaining of property by false pretenses.
Vincent C. Nardone
Member of the Middler Class
41, One further distinction between the two crimes which should be noted is that the crime of larceny

by trick may be committed by the use of any trick, artifice, design or fraud, wh'ereas in the crime of
false pretenses, the defendant must make a statement, as distinguished from a promise, of a past
or present fact.

